UCL Crypto Group | Dr. Mathieu Renauld

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Seminars given

September 12, 2012 - Advanced Extraction and Exploitation of Side-Channel Information in Cryptographic Implementations
by Dr. Mathieu Renauld

Abstract:

With technology scaling, electronic devices are becoming ubiquitous in everyday applications (smartcards, car keys,...). Many of these applications require security or privacy features for which cryptography is an essential building block. In the context of small embedded devices like smartcards, the security of cryptographic primitives is usually assessed using different types of cryptanalyses. For example, classical cryptanalysis targets the algorithm as a mathematical object. However, these devices are often physically accessible to the adversary, additionally allowing him to target the implementations of cryptographic algorithms, with physical cryptanalyses. In this setting, side-channel attacks exploiting (for example) the power consumption of microelectronic circuits have received increasing attention since their introduction 15 years ago, as they raise important challenges for secure hardware manufacturers Evaluating the side-channel security of an implementation is a non-trivial task: there are no hard-and-fast rules to decide what is the optimal way to extract information from a side-channel leakage, or how to efficiently exploit it to break a cryptosystem. This thesis tackles this problem and aims at developing and analyzing new tools and metrics in order to better answer both questions. In the extraction part, we present a refined metric for evaluating the quantity of information available in actual side-channel measurements. We illustrate its importance by adapting it to the evaluation of various countermeasures introduced in the literature. In the exploitation part, we develop a new attack called Algebraic Side-Channel Attack that exploits at the same time all the information available in the leakages and the adversary's computational power. It can succeed in very challenging scenarios using as few as one single leakage trace. We also present a new enumeration algorithm that can be integrated into any DPA attack in order to increase its success rate at the cost of more intense computations. We finally combine these observations by arguing about the need of new and properly defined classes of physical adversaries.

BibTeX - Renauld

Publications

Christophe Petit, Mathieu Renauld, and François-Xavier Standaert. On a particular case of the bisymmetric equation for quasigroups, In Acta Mathematica Hungarica, June 2014, DOI 10.1007/s10474-014-0428-y BibTeX

Nicolas Veyrat-Charvillon, Benoit Gérard, Mathieu Renauld, and François-Xavier Standaert. An Optimal Key Enumeration Algorithm and its Application to Side-Channel Attacks, In L. Knudsen, editor(s), Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC 2012), Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), August 2012, To appear BibTeX

Marcel Medwed, Christophe Petit, Francesco Regazzoni, Mathieu Renauld, and François-Xavier Standaert. Fresh Re-Keying II: Securing Multiple Parties against Side-Channel and Fault Attacks, 10th Smart Card Research and Advanced Application Conference (CARDIS) 2011, September 2011 BibTeX

Mathieu Renauld, and François-Xavier Standaert. Representation-, Leakage- and Cipher- Dependencies in Algebraic Side-Channel Attacks, industrial track of ACNS 2010, June 2010 PDF BibTeX

Mathieu Renauld, and François-Xavier Standaert. Algebraic Side-Channel Attacks, In Feng Bao, Moti Yung, Dongdai Lin, Jiwu Jing, editor(s), Information Security and Cryptology (INSCRYPT) 2009, Volume 6151 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 393-410, Springer, December 2009 PDF BibTeX

Mathieu Renauld, François-Xavier Standaert, and Nicolas Veyrat-Charvillon. Algebraic Side-Channel Attacks on the AES: Why Time also Matters in DPA, Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES 2009), Volume 5747 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 97-111, Springer, September 2009 PDF BibTeX

Mathieu Renauld, and François-Xavier Standaert. Combining Algebraic and Side-Channel Cryptanalysis against Block Ciphers, 30-th Symposium on Information Theory in the Benelux, May 2009 PDF BibTeX

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