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If you wish to be informed about our seminars by email,
please contact Francesco Berti, Olivier Pereira or François-Xavier Standaert .
Seminars for the year 2016
June 2016
June 16, 11:00 - Internet Voting on Insecure Platforms
by Pr. Yvo Desmedt
| Date: | June 16, 2016 - 11:00 |
| Location: | Maxwell Building, first floor
Place du Levant, 3 - 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve |
| Abstract: | Due to massive hacking and the Snowden leak, the public at large is aware that
modern computers and ``secure'' communication over the Internet cannot be
fully trusted. The research on booth based voting (where one can trust the
voting equipment) has been going on for 35 years. However, the legislature and
the public want voting over the Internet. In such setting, to be realistic,
one has to assume the voter's platform might be hacked.
Chaum introduced code voting as a solution for using a possibly
infected-by-malware device to cast a vote in an electronic voting application.
He trusted the postal mail system. However, a conspiracy between the mail
system and the recipient of the cast ballots breaks privacy. Moreover Chaum's
system is also unpopular because the voting procedure is different from what
is currently used.
To deal with these problems, we consider a t-bounded passive adversary and we
remove the trust in the mail system. We propose both single and multi-seat
elections, using PSMT (Perfectly Secure Message Transmission) protocols where
with the help of visual aids, humans can carry out mod 10 addition correctly
with a 99% degree of accuracy. We introduce an unconditionally secure MIX
based on the combinatorics of set systems. |
July 2016
July 14, 14:00 - Fully Leakage-Resilient Codes
by Dr. Antonio Faonio
| Date: | July 14, 2016 - 14:00 |
| Location: | Room a.007, Euler Building (near Maxwell Building)
Avenue Georges Lemaître, 4-6 - 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve |
| Abstract: | Leakage resilient codes (LRCs) are probabilistic encoding schemes that guarantee message hiding even under some bounded leakage on the codeword. We introduce the notion of fully leakage resilient codes (FLRCs), where the adversary can leak λ 0 bits from the encoding process, namely, the message and the randomness involved during the encoding process. In addition the adversary can as usual leak from the codeword.
We give a simulation-based definition requiring that the adversary’s leakage from the encoding process and the codeword can be simulated given just λ 0 bits of leakage from the message. We give a fairly general impossibility result for FLRCs in the popular split-state model, where the codeword is broken into independent parts and where the leakage occurs independently on the parts. We then give two feasibility results for weaker models.
First, we show that for NC 0 -bounded leakage from the randomness and arbitrary poly-time leakage from the parts of the codeword the inner-product construction proposed by Daví et al. (SCN’10) and successively improved by Dziembowski and Faust (ASIACRYPT’11) is a FLRC for the split-state model.
Second, we provide a compiler from any LRC to a FLRC in the common reference string model where the leakage on the encoding comes from a fixed leakage family of small cardinality. In particular, this compiler applies to the split-state model but also to other models. |
December 2016
December 21, 10:30 - Designing hardware differently- secured ICs.
| Date: | December 21, 2016 - 10:30 |
| Location: | Salle Shannon - Maxwell Building, first floor.
Place du Levant, 3 - 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve |
| Abstract: | Model based statistical SCA attacks in general and Power Analysis (PA) attacks in particular
rely on the attacker's ability to synchronize its current hypotheses with current measurements. In this talk,
we'll present a new circuit design paradigm, termed Pseudo-Asynchronous (pAsynch). This design style
combines the security advantages of asynchronous circuits with the ease of synchronous circuit design.
Although it may seem rather paradoxical, data-dependencies are used to hide temporal leakages and make
the crucial preprocessing (synchronization) stage hard to perform. Circuit level analysis followed by Welsh
t-Test indicate that the current traces still contain information about the key. Nevertheless, as we'll show, it
is very hard to extract it. Namely, the mutual information (MI) between the correct key and the key obtained
by a CPA attack is significantly reduced as compared to CMOS and other random-temporal-hiding based
techniques. Moreover, the concept of utilizing internal data-dependent signals is also shown to efficiently
counteract leakage-power-analysis (LPA) attacks and to protect combinational circuits by carefully
assigning (in the design phase) pre-calculated data-dependent delays to logical-paths.
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